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In last month's column, as part of a discussion of
application of Montana law to out-of-state auto poli-
cies, I pointed out some of the consumer-friendly cases
that exist in Montana. Two attomeys subsequently told
me they were pleased to discovet in that column, cases
that invalidated insurance provisions with which they
had been wrestling on behalf of their claimants. Conse-
quently, I thought this month it might be beneficial to
review cases in which the Montana Supreme Court has
invalidated or limited provisions of the standard auto
policies. By reason of space limitations, I cannot refer
to all cases construing auto policies in Montana but will
try to mention significant cases of invalidation of auto
insurance clauses.
Generally, the court has invalidated auto insur-
ance provisions on one of three grounds: First, if the
provision causes ari auto liability policy to violate Mon-
tana's Mandatory Lizbrliry Protection Act, MCA 61-6-
301 to 61.-6-304, either in coverage or amounts, itmay
be voided. Second, the court will declare a provision
invalid if it violates the Uninsured Motorist statute,
MCA 33-23-201. Third, a provision may be declared
invalid if the court determines that it violates the
insured customer's reasonable expectations about the
policy promises.
Provisions declared invalid on ground of public
policy as stated in the Mandatory Liability Protec-
tion Act.
The Mandatory Liability Ptotection Act requires
owners of motor vehicles "registered and operated" in
Montana to insure against loss from liability '"caused by
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" (the vehicle
must be insured in amounts set forth in the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, MCA 61-6-103 to
151 which is referenced in the Mandatory Liability
Protection Act). The requirement to insure liability
arising out of "maintenance or use" is very broad. If
the claima¡rt who is not the cause of his or her own
injury has been iniured through "maintena¡rce or use"
of an automobile, and the insurer of the automobile
contends that the injury is excepted from coverage by
reason of some exclusion, limitation, offset, or condi-
tion of the policy, claimant's counsel should immedi-
ately assess the rmport of the provision to determine
whether it violates public policy as expressed in the act.
The question is, does the provision result in the policy
containing less coverage or limits than required by the
Mandatory Liability Protection Act? The Montana
Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated provisions
that do. Consider these examples:
In Trønsamerica In¡. Co. a. Ro/e, 202 Mont. 173,
656 P.2d 820 (1983), the court declared invalid the
"farnily" exclusion that blocked liability coverage from
providing benefits to a member of the family living in
the same household. The clause is invalid as applied to
a policy obtained under the Mandatory Liability Insur-
ance ,{ct since the act requires coverage "aga.inst loss...
suffered by any person" and contains no exception for
family members residing under the same roof. FIow-
ever, in Shook a. State Farn, 872 F.Supp 768 (7994),
Federal District Judge Hatfield held ¡hat a household
exclusion that limits z farnlly member's recovery to the
minimum liability limits is not void as apinst public
policy in Montana. $Jote, however, thatJudge HatFreld,
in that decision, found State Farm's clause invalid
because it defeated the "reasonable expectations" of the
insured.) In Statq1nøn u. Safeco Ins. Co.,2B4 Mont. 372,
945P.2d32 (7997), the Montana Supreme Court upheld
a farnly exclusion in underinsured motorist coverage,
citing the fact ¡hat UIM coverage is not statutorily
mandated.
In Allstan Ins. Co. u. Hankinson,244 Mont. 1,795
P.2d 480 (1990), the "with the owner's permission"
language that qualified the coverage if the rnsured drove
non-owned autos was struck as berng conlrary to public
policy because it excluded coverage mandated by the
statute. Theoretically, even a thiefs auto insurance
should cover him while he is fleeing in a stolen ('non-
owned') car.
Safeco's "employee" exclusion blocking auto lia-
bility coverage for "bodily injury to an employee of any
insured person arising in the couÍse of employment"
was declared invalid for depriving employees of cover-
age even where they brought the claim against a third-
party insured who was not their employer. An employee
exclusion mzy valídly block coverage on a claim against
the employer that is covered by work comp. The
broader exclusion violates the mandatory coverage re-
quirement of MCA 67-6-30I. Firc In¡. Exchange u. Tibi,
Kayser and Albtate,2l MFR 1ó2 ftIatfield 1996).
The court held that an insurer could not exclude
liability coverage for an auto dealer's customer who is
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driving 
.a" "loaflef." in Bill Atkin
Volktwagen, Inc. a. McCkfer4t, 2'l'3
Mont. 99, 689 P.2d 1237 (1984).
Agarn, the statute applies to all vehi-
cles "registered and operated" and
makes no exception for an owner
who is an auto dealer providing
"loaner" vehicles.
In Iouø Mat. In¡. Co. u. Daris,
23L Mo¡t. 166,7 52 P.2d L66 (1988),
the court held that a "named driver"
exclusion was invalid since MCA
61.-6-301- prohibited the exclusion of
named drivers from statutotT
minimum coverage under a motor
vehicle liability policy. The insured
and insurer could not agree to
exclude a named family member as
an insured driver. However, the
L989 legislatute, reacting to Døuis
amended MCA 61-6-301 adding
subsection (1)þ) to allow the parties
to the insuranêe contract to ex-
clude a named family member from
insurance.
Provisions declared invalid on
ground of public policy as stated
in the Uninsured Motorist
stâtute.
The second general ground
for invalidation of auto insurance
clauses in Montana is the Unlnsured
Motorist Statute, ll4CA 33-23-207.
That stâtute requires that any motor
vehicle liability policy offered in
Montana must contain coverage in
the amounts specified in the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
protecting persons insured from
damages arising out of the operation
or use of uninsured motor vehicles.
While the statute gives the named
insured the right to reject the cover-
age, the Montana Supreme Court
has treated UM coverage as a
mandatory or "compulsory cover-
zge" arrd has tested UM auto insur-
ance provisions against the statute
iust as they have with the Mandatory
Liability Protection 
'\ct. The test of
validity of a provision excluding or
limiting UM coverage in the face
of MCA 33-23-20I is: Does the
exclusion or limitation give less cov-
erage for acts of the uninsured
driver than the insured driver?
Flence, if a provision results in UM
coverage or limits less than those
statutorily required, it may be invali-
dated. Consider the following cases:
The court ruled invalid a pol-
icy clause which requires, as a pre-
condition to coverage, that there be
physical contact between insured's
car and the uninsured motorist's car,
since such a requirement is in dero-
gation of MCA 33-23-201 which
contains no such precondition.
McGþnn a. Safeco Iw. Co., 216
Mont.379, 707 P.2d 735 (1985). Sæ
øho, Palmer b1 Diacorc u. Fanners Ins.
Exch.,233 Mort. 51.5,761. P.2d 401
(1eBB).
The court held that an insurer
cannot limit UM coverage to cases
where the injured person is
"occupying" the insured auto, since
that violates the public policy behind
MCA 33-23-201, of protecting all
insureds against injury by uninsured
motorists. Jacobson u. Imþlenent Deal-
er¡ Mat.Ins. C0.,196 Mont. 542,640
P.2d 908 (i982). Note however,
that the court in Chilbery u. Ro¡e and
Mid Centarl, 273 Mont. 414, 903
P.2d 1,377 (1995) held that the in-
sured occupant could only recover
one of three UM policy coverages
because they were payable to an
insured who "occupied" the insured
auto, and the coutt said he could
only occupy (and therefore be an
insured in) one car zt z time. (Ihe
court distinguìshed Sayn where the
claimant flrt the definition of
"iflsured" undet each policy without
being an occupant.)
I¡ Sulliuan u. Doe, 159 Mont.
50, 495 P.2d 793 (1972), the court
struck, as violating the legislative
intent of the uninsured motorist
statute (now MCA 33-23-201), the
"workers' compensation offset," a
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policy provision that reduced the
UM benefit where the injured in-
sured received workers cornpensa-
tion benefits. The offset could have
reduced the UM limit below the
$10,000 then required by the UM
statute.
In Cuiberson u. Harford Cas.
1rc. Co., 2I7 Mont. 279,704 P.2d 68
(1985), the court voided a clause
whose import was to exclude UM
coverage where the driver had'no
permission to use the vehicle. The
court held the clause void as against
public policy. (fintinger, an escaped
mental patient, stole a beer distribu-
tor's truck and iniured its driver,
Guiberson, who was riding on it
trying to get Tritinger to stop.)
The court held, in Oleson u.
Farmer¡ Ins. Cruap, 185 Mont. 164,
605 P.2d 166 (19B0), that an auto
tortfeasor's p.olicy that has limits of
liabiliry less than the amounts speci-
fied in the "financial responsibility
statutes" of the state is not an "auto
liability policy" that voids UM cov-
erage. FIence, a vehicle with a
$20,000 BI limit would be 
^rr
"uninsured motor vehicle."
The court invalidated an off-
set provision by which Nationwide
puqported to reduce its UM/UIM
coverage by 
-y amount paid by or
for any liable parties . Crier u. Nation-
u¿de Mutual In¡arance Companl, 248
Mont. 457, 812 P.2d 347 (1991).
Grier's Nationwide policy contained
Uninsured Motorist coverage which
included an underinsured motor ve-
hicle in the definitron of uninsured.
Fïence, underinsured coverage was
patt of the uninsured coverage sec-
tion and there was no separate un-
derinsured coverage. The court in-
validated the offset, because its im-
port was to reduce UM coverage
below that required by the UM
statute in Montana.
The "no consent to settle-
ment" clause that prohibits the
insured from settling with the tort-
feasor without permission of the
insured's UM carried was invali-
dated in State Fønz Mut. Autonobih
Ins. Co. a. Tallor, 223 Mont. 275,
725 P.2d 821 (1986) because it
prevented the insured from enforc-
ing the contractual promise of UM
covefage.
Dagel u. Farmer¡ Ins. Gruup,273
Mont. 402,903 P.2d 1359 (1995)
held that you don't have to exhaust
the occupied auto UM coverage to
make a claim on the passenger's
own UM coverage (or the permis-
sive user's UM coverage) since the
statutory contingency of "not in-
sured by a bodily injury liability
bond or policy" is met.
In the 7979 stacking case of
Cltafee u. Ur¿ìted Stater Fidelitjt dz
Cuaranry Co.,I8I Mont. 1, 591. P.2d
7102, ¡he court held that it was
against public policy for a limit of
liability clause to restrict recovery to
one' UM policy limit where there
were three vehicles insured for three
premiums under one policy since they
should be treated the same as if they
were insured under three policies. In
reaction, the legislatut" itr 1981 
"n-acted MCÂ 33-23-203 which blocked
stacking of coverages for multiple
cars under a single policy but not for
multiple cars under separate policies.
@,ffective May 2, 1997, ¡hat statute
was amended with intent to block all
stacking for policies taking effect af-
ter that date.)
Provisions declared invalid on
ground of defeating insurance
consumerts reasonable expecta-
tions
Invalidation of coverage
provisions for violating the
Mandatory Liability Protection
Act and the Uninsured Motorist
Act only occurs for the mandatory
or compulsory Bodily Injury Lia-
bility coverages 'and Uninsured
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rMotorist coverage. Note that Medical Pay cover-
age and Underinsured motorist coverage have no
statutory protection. FIowever, if the UIM cover-
age is actually just a definition existing under the
UM coverage, then the court will protect the UIM
benefit as being compulsory UM coverage. See,
Grier u. Nationwide, above. The lack of statutory
proteciion for Medical Pay coverage and Underin-
sured Motorist coverâge brings us the third maior
reason for court invalidation of auto insurance
provisions, the doctrine of the consumer's
"reasonable expectations." If a consumer, consid-
ering a policy's language, format, and organization
would hzve a reasonable expectation that the con:
tract provided a benefit, then the court will honor
that benefit.
Though the court voided the family exclusion
in Tran¡america Ins. Co. u. Ro/e, above, on grounds
that it violated the Mandatory Liability Protection
Âct, the justices also held "that the household
exclusion clause is invalid due to its failure to
'honor the reasonable expectations' of the pur-
chaser of the policy." FIowever, in Stutryaan u.
Safeco Ins. Co., above, the court found Safeco's
household exclusion in the UIM coverage was not
ambiguous and didn't defeat reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured. On the other hand, in Leibrand
u. National Farmers Union, 272 Mont. 1, 898 P.2d
1220 (1995), the court declared invalid family
exclusion clauses limiting recovery to "limits of
liability required by law" or to "the financial limits
of the policy state" as being ambiguous.
In Shooþ. u. Sun Farw, 872 F.Supp 768 (D. Mont.
1,994), the federal couft (I{atfield) found that State
Farm's "funily exclusion" clause limiting family member
recovery to the minimum liability lìmit was ambiguous
because of its policy placement and held that it defeated
"reasonable expectations" of the insured so as to be
unenforceable.
In Farners Alliønce Mutua/ a. Holenan,27B Mont.
274, 924 P.2d I3I5 (7996), the court invalidated the
arrtì-stacking provisions of the Medical Pay and Underin-
sured Motorist Coverages (optional coverages) where
separate premiums are charged for multiple vehicles
under a single policy. The court held that MCA 33-23-
203 does not prohibit stacking in those situations.
(Senate Bills 266 and 44,1997 Mont. Iægislature, both
amended }r/rCA 33-23-203 with intent to prohibit stack-
ing of any auto casualty coverage. The statute refers now
to "each part of the policy" and applies regardless of "the
number of policies issued by the same comparìy covering
the insured, or the number of separate premiums paid."
SB 44 effective May 2, 7977, for policies taking effect
after that date. This overrides the stacking in Førn¿er¡
Alliance Matuøl u. Holemaru)
In Bercnett u. State Famt, 26I Mont. 386, 826 P.2d
1146 (1,993), the court invalidated State Farm's anti-
stacking "other insurance" provisions for UIM coverages
for automobiles declared under the same policy with
separate premiums. The court said the fact that UIM is
not statutorily required was irrelevant because the same
public policy considerations existed under the reasonable
expectations doctrine. The court said: "Montana citizens
should have z reasonable expectation that when they
purchase separate policies for underinsured motorist
coverage, they will receive adequate compensation for
losses caused by an underinsured motorist, up to the
aggrepte limits of the policies they have purchased."
(Ihis was on certification from the Ninth Circuit which
was reviewing Judge Hatfield's decision at 758
F.Supp.1388 [1991] in which he came to the same
conclusion.) Agarn, for policies effective after ApnI 2,
1.997, stacking is now blocked by the amended MC,\
33-23-203.
The court, in Rackdaschel u. State Farm,2B5 Mont.
395, 948 P.2d 700 (1997), invalidated contractual anti-
stacking provisions that applied to medical cove(age on
the ground that the public policy against anti-stacking
provisionS was the same for optional as it was for
mandatory coverages.
H
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In Augustine, Aagustine and Crry u. Simonson ønd
Farmers Ins. Exchange,283 Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 1,1,6
(1997), the court said: "The provision requiring that the
tortfeasor's liability insurance be entirely exhausted as a
prerequisite to securing indemnification from the Under-
insured Motorist coverage is contrary to Montana public
policy and unenforceable to the extent that it violates
public policy." (Public policy to encourage settlement
and avoid unnecessary litigation.) The decision cited
Sorcnsln, aboue, fot the proposition that UIM coverage
may not be voided on technicaliaes. Augusine lays out
the procedure for calculatirig Underinsured Motorist
Coverage where there is potential recovery from a third
party tortfeasor.
Provisions Declared Invalid on Other Public Policy
Grounds
In Sorcnsen u. Farrzers Insurance Excbange,279 Mont.
291,927 P.2d 1002 (1996), the court adopted a "îo
prejudice" rule that, absent some showing of material
prejudice to the underinsurance carrier, z claLm fot
Underinsured Motorist coverage may not be precluded
on the technicality that the insured released the tortfeasor
and destroyed the insurer's right of subrogation. Farm-
ers contended that the release destroyed their right of
subrogation. The court noted absence of preiudice from
destruction of the subrogation right where the tortfeasor
is judgment proof. FIence, the insured may recover on
an Underinsured Motorist claim after releasing the tort-
feasor without the insurer's permission, if the tortfeasor
is judgment proof.
The court declared the subrogation clause âs ap-
plied to automobile Medical Pay coverage invalid as an
assignment of a personal injury chose in action n All¡tate
In¡. Co. u. Reitler, I92 Mont. 357, 628 P.2d 667 (1981).
See aho, Youngbbod u. American States Insurance Co., 262
Mont. 391, 866P.2d 203 (1993) for the same holding.
The Reitler holding was limited to auto Medical Pay.
Subrogation to recover UM coverage has been approved.
Fanners Ins. Exch. u. Chri¡tenson,2lI Mont. 250,683P.2d
131e (1e84).
The court limited application of the subroga.tion
clause to those situations in which the insured has
recovered the insured's entire loss plus costs including
attomey fees, before the insurer can subroga.te. Skaa¿e a.
Moantøin Stans Te/. dv Tel. C0.,772 Mont. 521, 565 P.2d
628 (1977) and DeTienne A¡sociate¡ u. Førrners Union Mut.
Ins. Co., 266 Mont. 184, 87 9 P .2d 7 0 4 (1 994). The theory
is that if a patry must bear the loss, it should be the
insurer, since that is the risk the insured paid the insurer
to assume.
The court invalidated the subrogation clause as
applied to the insurer's own insured and any additional
insured under the policy n Truck Ins. Exch. V. Trantport
Indem. C0.,180 Mont. 41.9,591P.2d 188 (1979).
In Bill Atkin Volkswagen, Inc. a. M{kferry, 2L3
Mont. 99, 689 P.2d 1237 (1984), the court declared
excess clauses toibe mutually repugnant where both
policies claimed to be excess and held each liable for a
prc rata share of the loss apportioned in ratio of the limit
of each to Èhe total limit of available coverage. (Ihe fact
that the coverage is required by the Fina¡rcial Responsi-
bility Act or the Mandatory Liability Act does not mea:-r
it must be primary as long as there is adequate coverage.)
Conclusion
The list of auto insurance policy provisions invali-
dated by the Montana Supreme Cout is extensive and
conFrrms the court's commitrnent to test insurance provi-
sions to ensure that they comport with public policy.
Consumer counsel needs to know the public policy bases
undedying the insurance code and to understand when a
provision's effect violates those public policies. In that
manner, counsel can protect Montana claimants and
insureds from the unfairness of unlawful exclusions,
limitations, offsets, or conditions. r
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